Zoning Board of Appeals

Agenda for ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS JANUARY 7, 2026 7:30 PM Skokie Village Hall, 5127 Oakton Street - Council Chambers 1) Call to Order/Declaration of Quorum 2) Roll Call 3) Approval of Meeting Minutes November 19, 2025 4) Old Business 5) New Business a. 6900 Leclaire Avenue • 2025-08Z: Appeal to Administrative Decision Appeal to administrative decision regarding interpretation of ‘improved alley’ from §118-212 (c)(6). 6) Public Comment 7) Communications from Staff 8) Adjournment Next Meeting of the Zoning Board of Appeals is scheduled for January 21, 2025. Individuals with questions or feedback about an agenda item may contact Brian Augustine with the Community Development Department by calling 847-933-8223 or by emailing publiccomments@skokie.org. All emails and comments submitted will be made public and shared with this body. The Village, in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, requests that persons with disabilities who require certain accommodations to allow them to observe or participate in this hearing, or who have questions about the accessibility of the meeting facilities, contact the Village’s ADA coordinator Angel Schnur at angel.schnur@skokie.org or 847.933.8400.  Meeting Minutes for Zoning Board of Appeals November 19, 2025 | 7:30 PM Skokie Village Hall | 5127 Oakton Street, Skokie IL 60077 | Council Chambers Members Present: Brian O’Donnell, Chair Nicholas Werth, Vice-Chair Elaine Jacobson Sharon Roos-Kirkpatrick Daniel Strauss David Solovy Jay Trivedi Members Absent: David Putrus Sean Arden Presiding Officer: Kate Portillo, Planning Manager Staff Present: Tyler Kobylski, Asst. Corporation Counsel Others Present: 1) Time Meeting was Called to Order/Declaration of Quorum A quorum being present, Chair O’Donnell called the meeting to order at 7:31 PM. 2) Approval of Meeting Minutes A motion was made by Vice-Chair Werth to approve the minutes of the September 17, 2025 Zoning Board of Appeals. The motion was seconded by Commissioner Trivedi. All present members voted aye with two absences. 3) Old Business No old business was discussed. 4) New Business 2025-07Z – 7880 Lincoln Ave Petitioner: Zane Zielinki on behalf of 7880 N Lincoln LLC Request: Variation to improve a parking lot resulting in 13-foot wide drive aisle with abutting parallel parking spaces and 9-foot wide parking spaces abutting a wall. The Chair confirmed with Corporation Counsel that proper notice had been served and notarized for this case. Petitioner Presentation: Doc 637305 – ZBA Meeting Minutes for November 19, 2025  Mr. Zane Zielinski appeared representing 7880 North Lincoln Avenue LLC. After being sworn in, he explained that they were requesting a variance to accommodate sufficient off-street parking for their plan to redevelop the property to include residential units on the second floor. The property is already mixed-use, and they need a one-foot variance due to a retaining wall on one side and another one-foot variance for the other parking area. Mr. Zielinski noted that they had sent out notices to surrounding property owners as required and had received no feedback or complaints. He also mentioned that they had posted the required sign on the property windows. Commissioner Trivedi asked about the notification process, and Mr. Zielinski confirmed he had mailed notices to everyone within the required 250-foot radius and left his contact information for questions, but received no responses. Commissioner Strauss inquired why they needed variances for both the driveway and parking spaces rather than just one. Mr. Zielinski explained that both variances were necessary to provide enough parking spaces for the development. Adrian, the general contractor who accompanied Mr. Zielinski, added that traffic through the parking area would be one-way from the alley toward the street, with appropriate signage. Commissioner Trivedi raised safety concerns about whether there would be adequate space for cars to pass through if vehicles were parked in parallel spaces. The general contractor confirmed there would be one-way traffic only due to the busy street, though he noted large vehicles like "80-wheelers" would not be able to access the area. The Chair mentioned that he had asked staff whether the space would be large enough for a vehicle like a Grand Caravan to pass through, and had been assured this would not be an issue. With no further questions, Mr. Zielinski concluded by reiterating that their goal was to add residential units to the property while ensuring sufficient parking. Motion to grant the variance was made by Commissioner Trivedi to grant a variance for the petitioner, 7880 Lincoln Avenue LLC, for a 13-foot wide drive aisle width abutting parallel parking spaces and 9-foot wide parking spaces abutting a wall. The motion was seconded by Commissioner Jacobson. The motion passed unanimously with all seven commissioners voting aye. The vote was unanimous with two absences. Motion: Trivedi Second: Jacobson Ayes: 7 Nays: 0 Absent: 2 Doc 637305 – ZBA Meeting Minutes for November 19, 2025  Corporation Counsel advised that a covenant would be prepared for the property owner's signature, and staff would contact the petitioner when it was ready. The covenant would need to be recorded before any building permits or certificates of occupancy could be issued. 5) Communication from Staff Staff recommended a schedule for the 2026 meetings. The Chair presented a different approach to scheduling meetings for 2026. Rather than having fixed meeting dates, he proposed that Zoning Board of Appeals meetings would be scheduled on the first and third Wednesdays of the month as needed, when complete applications are received and in accordance with legal notice requirements, pending quorum. The Chair explained that this approach would provide more flexibility and prevent unnecessary meeting cancellations. He noted that his concern with the previous approach was that having only one locked-in meeting per month during certain periods could cause undue hardship for petitioners who would otherwise have to wait for the next scheduled meeting. A motion to approve the flexible meeting schedule approach was made and unanimously approved by voice vote. 6) Public Comment There were no public comments. 7) Adjournment Meeting adjourned at 7:54 PM Respectfully Submitted Brian Augustine, Zoning Administrator/Permit Supervisor Doc 637305 – ZBA Meeting Minutes for November 19, 2025 STAFF REPORT 2025-08Z: Appeal to Administrative Decision Community Development Department Council Chambers, 7:30 PM, January 7, 2026 To: Brian O’Donnell, Chairman, Zoning Board of Appeals From: Brian J. Augustine, Zoning Administrator Mike Voitik, Planning Coordinator Re: Appeal to administrative decision regarding improved alleys General Information Request Appeal to administrative decision regarding improved alley. Code Section Section 118-212 (c)(6) Location. Access to off-street parking can only be from a public alley. Subsequent to October 16, 2023, new curb cuts are prohibited unless the lot does not abut a public improved alley. Relief may only be granted for mixed- use, business or industrial properties. Petitioner Roman & Jacqueline Bujdei Location 6900 Leclaire Avenue PETITIONER’S SUBMITTAL The petitioner is appealing an administrative decision by the Zoning Administrator regarding the interpretation of an improved alley and that the stone alley located north of the subject site is not considered improved. The applicant’s submittal packet is attached. STAFF ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION Staff recommends the Zoning Board of Appeals affirm the decision of the Zoning Administrator. The petitioner seeks to demolish an existing single-family residential property and construct a new single-family home. The property presently has access to both an alley and an existing curb cut on Leclaire Ave, but the petitioner has expressed a preference for constructing an attached home with a new curb cut on Morse Avenue. While the appeal focuses an administrative decision regarding the interpretation of improved alley as the cause for a new curb cut on Morse Ave, the applicant also has the option to re-use the existing curb cut on Leclaire Ave. Finally, there is no relief for this code section available for property located in Skokie’s residential districts. The Village Staff does find that all alleys that are improved in some way to allow for vehicular access are considered improved. The Staff Slide Presentation, that will be provided at the ZBA meeting, shows examples of these improvements around that Village that include improved stone, cement, and green alleys. The stone, cement and green alleys are Doc 637218 ZBA Staff Report for 2025-8Z – Appeal to Administrative Decision regarding improved alleys similar in that they have had different levels of improvements made to them. Regular Village improvements range from adding and leveling of stone or gravel, to weed removal, and in some instances to paving or installation of permeable pavers. These different levels of improvements have been made to make pedestrian and vehicular traffic possible and easier, which in turn allows for refuse and recycling to be picked up and utility companies to access their equipment. Given concerns for sustainability and maintaining permeable surfaces throughout the Village it is likely that not all alleys will ever have impermeable surfaces such as concrete or asphalt and may continue to have more permeable improvement applications like grass or stone. The Zoning Administrator’s interpretation of the alley at the rear of 6900 Leclaire as improved is further substantiated by the attached email from Russ Rietveld, Director of Engineering. This explains what types of improved alleys the Village of Skokie maintains. The email from Michael Lochner, Supervisor of Streets and Alleys, specifies the improvements that have been made to this particular alley in the past and what will be made in the near future to the alley north of the subject lot and other stone alleys. To classify stone alleys as unimproved ignores the fact that in addition to there being stone installed, routine maintenance by the Village or contractors such as grading and leveling, and scarifying (to cut and remove debris from) of the center of the alley, and alley trimming of vegetation occurs. Approximately 22 other homes on this alley utilize the alley for the collection of refuse; there are several homes that utilize this alley way for garage access. The unimproved alleys not only do not have improvements made to the driving surface, they have no curb cuts to allow for vehicular access. Additionally, all refuse is collected from the street side of property and not these inaccessible plots of land areas. Background At the August 17, 2023 Plan Commission meeting, the Village undertook a zoning text amendment (Case 2023-18P) to support the adopted Environmental Sustainability Plan. The adopted text change was: §118-212 (c)(6) Location. Access to off-street parking can only be from a public alley. Curb cuts are prohibited unless the lot does not abut a public improved alley. Relief may only be granted for mixed-use, business or industrial properties. This reduced new curb cuts in residential districts where alley access was available or an existing access point through a curb cut was available. The goals of the of text change included: 1. Storm water reduction into the combined sewer system 2. Creating a more pedestrian friendly environment 3. Reduction of the loss of front yard green space and tree removal 4. Reduction of the loss of on-street parking spaces. At the Plan Commission meeting there was discussion of conditions of some alleys. The discussion focused on “public alleys” and did not define “improved”. At no time during the discussion did any Commissioner want further clarification on or wish to define an improved Doc 637218 ZBA Staff Report for 2025-8Z – Appeal to Administrative Decision regarding improved alleys alley. It was understood that alleys in Skokie are improved with a range of materials that include pavers, stone, gravel, concrete, and asphalt. The Commissioners did specifically want the proposed Ordinance changed to reference only “new” curb cuts and not prohibit the re-use of existing curb cuts (in instances where off street parking might still be gained from an alley access). The dialogue referencing the condition of alleys did not go any further than a discussion on need for better maintenance of some alleys. Currently there are approximately 20 alleys that were platted to eventually be public alleys and serve parcels at the rear, but no improvement was ever applied. These spaces remain grassed and often without curb cuts to access; in nearly all instances, homes were constructed and driveways were established to a public street and not the platted alley areas. The use of the word “improved” was meant to distinguish between alleys that are driveable (where trash is collected, cars access garages, etc). Improved was included in the text amendment because staff never intended for a resident who abuts one of these 20 areas to not be in the position to construct a garage with access to a grass area and then have to drive over the grass and a non-depressed curb to access a public street. Staff maintains that stone alleys are considered improved because of the improvements made to them. The alley north of the subject site has a stone application. The emails from the Engineering Division Director and the Supervisor of Streets and Alleys further upholds that the interpretation of the Zoning Administrator was correct. Additionally, semantics aside, the intention as documented by the Plan Commission was to limit new curb cuts, particularly when an alley or existing driveway with a curb cut is available. ATTACHMENTS 1. Applicant’s submittal packet 2. Staff Report for Case 2023-18P 3. Youtube link to August 17, 2023 Plan Commission meeting https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-ba6yYVlng&list=PLO- _svpah1tUlFgbAmPsbf7W9y9bkbGa2&index=31 4. Email from Russ Rietveld, Director of Engineering, dated January 2, 2026. 5. Email from Michael Lochner, Supervisor of Streets and Alleys, dated December 26, 2026. Doc 637218 ZBA Staff Report for 2025-8Z – Appeal to Administrative Decision regarding improved alleys November 24, 2025 Zoning Board of Appeals Village of Skokie 5127 Oakton Street Skokie, IL 60077 Re: Appeal of Zoning Administrator’s Interpretation of Zoning Ordinance Section 118-212(c)(6) regarding 6900 Le Claire Avenue (the “Property”) Dear Chairman and Members of the Zoning Board of Appeals: I, as the owner along with my wife, Jacqueline Bujdei, of the Property hereby formally appeal the Zoning Administrator’s interpretation as aZirmed on November 11, 2025 that the alley to the rear of the Property is an “improved” alley under Section 118-212(c)(6) of the Skokie Zoning Ordinance. For the reasons stated in the attached letter and the supporting documentation attached thereto, I assert that the alley to the rear of the Property is “unimproved” under the meaning of Section 118-212(c)(6). My contact information is: Roman Bujdei 4900 Coyle Avenue Skokie, Illinois 60077 Phone: 773-447-0808 Email: roman@bldpermits.com Thank you for your consideration of this matter. _________________________________ Roman Bujdei Attachments Chairman and Members Zoning Board of Appeals Village of Skokie 5127 Oakton Street Skokie, IL 60077 Re: Appeal of Zoning Administrator’s Interpretation of Zoning Ordinance Section 118-212(c)(6) regarding 6900 Le Claire Avenue (the “Property”) The following details the basis under which I respectfully assert that the Skokie Zoning Administrator’s interpretation that the alley to the rear of the Property is “improved” for purposes of Section 118-212(c)(6) is incorrect and should be reversed by the Skokie Zoning Board of Appeals. I. ZONING ORDINANCE SECTION 118-212(c)(6) AND ZONING ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION Section 118-212(c)(6) of the Skokie Zoning Ordinance provides in pertinent part that: Subsequent to October 16, 2023, new curb cuts are prohibited unless the lot does not abut a public improved alley. By email dated November 11, 2025, the Zoning Administrator aZirmed his interpretation that the subject alley was “improved” and advised that procedurally the next step was an appeal of his decision to the Zoning Board of Appeals. See email attached as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein. II. BACKGROUND AND CONDITION OF THE ALLEY The Property is located at the northwest corner of Le Claire Avenue and Morse Avenue. It is improved with a single-story, single-family residence with an attached garage at the north end of the residence that is accessed from a driveway from Le Claire Avenue. See survey attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and photos of the Property attached hereto as Exhibit 3, both Exhibits incorporated herein. To the north of the Property is a dedicated 16-foot-wide alley the surface of which is partially gravel and partially vegetation. See alley photo attached as Exhibit 4 and incorporated herein. I and my wife, Jacqueline Bujdei, purchased the Property and desires to demolish the existing structures thereon and construct a new single-family home to be inhabited by our family. An attached garage located on the west side of the new home is intended to be part of the new single-family home and provide the required parking. The parking for the new home is to be accessed from a driveway from Morse Avenue, as is the predominant condition for the other single-family homes on the block. See preliminary site plan for the new home attached as Exhibit 5 and incorporated herein. The Zoning Administrator’s interpretation of Section 118-212(c)(6) would prohibit the driveway for the new home to be accessed from Morse Avenue III. REASONS WHY THE ZONING ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION THAT THE SUBJECT ALLEY IS “IMPROVED” IS INCORRECT A. DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF INTERPRETATION Article II of the Skokie Zoning Ordinance contains definitions of words used in the Zoning Ordinance. It does not, however, contain a definition of an “improved” alley. Section 118- 31(c) of the Skokie Zoning Ordinance provides: Where terms are not defined in this code and are defined in the International Building Code or the International Mechanical Code, as amended, such terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them as in those codes. Neither the International Building Code nor the International Mechanical Code contain a definition of an “improved” alley. Section 118-31(d) of the Skokie Zoning Ordinance further provides: Where terms are not defined [through] the methods authorized by this section, such terms shall have ordinarily accepted meaning such as the context implies. Furthermore, the Illinois courts have that any ambiguity in a zoning ordinance must be decided in favor of the property owners unrestricted us of his property. As the court in The County of Lake v. The First National Bank of Lake Forest, 386 N.E.2d 394, 68 Ill. App. 3d 693 (1979) stated: The law is settled that zoning ordinances are in derogation of common law rights to the use of real property and, therefore, such ordinances should be strictly construed in favor of the right of a property owner to the unrestricted use of his property. 68 Ill. App. 3d at 697. B. ACCEPTED MEANING OF “IMPROVED” ALLEY As previously mentioned, and the photo attached as Exhibit 4 shows, the subject alley’s surface consists merely of some loose gravel and vegetation. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a letter from Sabin Olteanu, an Illinois licensed professional engineer, that is familiar with Skokie requirements and inspect the subject alley. Based on condition of the alley and standard engineering definitions, he concludes that in his professional opinion “the existing gravel surface does not constitute an improved alley under typical acceptable civil engineering criteria”. Erik Sanchez, a professional engineer, that is on staZ with the Skokie Public Works Department/Engineering Division concurs that “gravel is not an improved surface”. See email from Mr. Sanchez attached as Exhibit 7 and incorporated herein. The Skokie Plan Commissioners in discussing the very section of the Zoning Ordinance that is at issue in this case, as noted in the minutes of August 17, 2023 Plan Commission attached as Exhibit 8 and incorporated herein, referred to gravel alleys as “unimproved”. Among the definition of “unimproved” public ways under The City of Chicago Department of Transportation (“CDOT”) definitions is a “gravel roadway”. See excerpt from CDOT definitions attached as Exhibit 9 and incorporated herein. Lastly, in appeal aZirming a jury verdict in favor of a plaintiZ who was injured when she tripped in alley it is stated that City of Evanston refers to an unpaved alley as an “unimproved alley”. See highlighted section on page 2 of Gutstein v. City of Evanston, Docket No. 1-08-3607 (2010) attached as Exhibit 10 and incorporated herein. In sum, it is clear that a gravel alley is not considered improved by engineering standards or similarly neighboring municipalities or even members of the Village of Skokie staZ or commissions. Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Skokie Zoning Board of Appeals reverse the determination of the Zoning Administrator that the subject alley is improved for purposes of Section 118-212(c)(6) of the Skokie Zoning Ordinance. ___________________________________ Roman Bujdei From: Brian Augus+ne <Brian.Augus+ne@skokie.org> Date: November 14, 2025 at 2:42:58 PM PST To: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com>, Johanna Nyden <Johanna.Nyden@skokie.org> Cc: Barbara Mangler <Barbara.Mangler@skokie.org> Subject: RE: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway RelocaBon Roman, No rush. Once you submit it, we will review for completeness and then check the upcoming mee+ng schedule. Have a good weekend, BRIAN J. AUGUSTINE _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ZONING ADMINISTRATOR/ PERMIT SUPERVISOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT/ BUILDING & INSPECTION SERVICES DIVISION _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5127 Oakton Street Skokie, Illinois 60077 Phone: (847) 933-8408 Office 847-933-8223 www.skokie.org Save +me and apply for your permit online at www.skokiepermits.com From: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com> Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2025 11:05 AM To: Brian Augus+ne <Brian.Augus+ne@Skokie.Org>; Johanna Nyden <Johanna.Nyden@SKOKIE.ORG> Cc: Barbara Mangler <Barbara.Mangler@skokie.org> Subject: Re: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway Reloca+on Thank you Brian, I will work on putting everything you requested below and sending it to you. Is there a time frame that I need to give this to you by? -Roman P: 773-447-0808 (cell) From: Brian Augustine <Brian.Augustine@Skokie.Org> Date: Wednesday, November 12, 2025 at 1:18 PM To: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com>, Johanna Nyden <Johanna.Nyden@SKOKIE.ORG> Cc: Barbara Mangler <Barbara.Mangler@skokie.org> Subject: RE: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway Relocation Roman, There is not a separate form to request an appeal a decision from the zoning official. We will need the following documents if you wish to make a formal appeal to my decision: 1. A cover page with your contact name, address (where you live) , phone and email address. 2. A leker (not email) from you , as to why you feel there was an error in the interpreta+on and what sec+on of the code was interpreted incorrectly. The specific code sec+on must be noted in your leker. Please sign and date the leker. 3. The leker or email from me, that made the interpreta+on, you wish to appeal. 4. Any suppor+ng documents you want to present as to why my interpreta+on of the Zoning Ordinance was incorrect in rela+on to your request. Please number each document separately. Example: #1 – Parking Study from ABC Parking Team #2 – Code requirement #3 – Engineering Report from XYZ Engineering 2 of 7 These documents will all be part of the packet. 5. Payment of $400 – you will be billed arer we receive the above documents and review it for completeness. Then we will schedule you for a hearing. You are not required to submit the following: 1. Proof of ownership (this decision is not +ed to one specific lot) 2. Plat of Survey 3. Pe++oner Statement 4. Parking analysis or Zoning Worksheet 5. Site plan or Landscape Plan One point of clarifica+on on the following statement that you made: “The definition should remain consistent across all cases - your email below states that a parking space with gravel is considered an unimproved surface. But why would a gravel parking space be considered unimproved, yet a gravel alley be considered improved” I did not say a gravel parking space is considered unimproved. I stated gravel is not an approved surface to park on. A gravel parking area is improved to be made a parking surface, but Skokie does not allow it as an approved parking surface. Similar to how alleys improved with gravel are allowed, by Skokie, to be driven on. Either way your conten+on is the alley interpreta+on not parking spaces. Take care, <image001.png> Brian J. Augus+ne _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ZONING ADMINISTRATOR/ PERMIT SUPERVISOR community development DEPARTMENT/ building & inspec+on services DIVISION _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5127 Oakton Street Skokie, Illinois 60077 Phone: (847) 933-8408 Office 847-933-8223 www.skokie.org Save +me and apply for your permit online at www.skokiepermits.com From: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com> Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2025 7:18 AM To: Johanna Nyden <Johanna.Nyden@skokie.org> Cc: Barbara Mangler <Barbara.Mangler@skokie.org>; Brian Augus+ne <Brian.Augus+ne@skokie.org> Subject: Re: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway Reloca+on Thank you Johanna, I will await to receive the form from Brian. -Roman On Nov 11, 2025, at 12:41 PM, Johanna Nyden <Johanna.Nyden@skokie.org> wrote: Hi Roman, Thank you again for your note. Your next step to escalate the maker would be to appeal the Zoning Official’s decision to the Zoning Board of Appeals. Your can find more informa+on here in the Village’s Zoning Code: hkps://library.municode.com/il/skokie/codes/zoning?nodeId=SUHITA_CH118ZO_ARTIAD_S118-7ZOBOAP Specifically the code section is: “Appeals to administrative decisions. The ZBA hears and decides appeals where it is alleged that there is an error in any order, requirement, decision, determination, or interpretation by the Zoning Official.” By copy of this email, I am asking Brian Augus+ne to provide you a form that you can u+lize to file your appeal. Once you file the form with the Village, we will schedule you on the next available mee+ng of the ZBA. Thanks, 3 of 7 Johanna From: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com> Sent: Monday, November 10, 2025 7:30 AM To: Brian Augus+ne <brian.augus+ne@skokie.org>; Johanna Nyden <johanna.nyden@skokie.org> Subject: RE: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway Reloca+on Hi Brian and Johanna, Thank you for your prompt response. I respectfully disagree with your interpretation, as I believe the determination of whether an alley is defined as “improved” would be in the Municipal or Zoning code. Since I did not find a definition in either, I reached out for clarification to Erik Sanchez, a licensed P.E. at Skokie Public Works, regarding whether gravel constitutes as an improved surface, I specifically inquired about alleys, driveways, and parking areas. His response was that gravel is not considered an improved surface. The definition should remain consistent across all cases - your email below states that a parking space with gravel is considered an unimproved surface. But why would a gravel parking space be considered unimproved, yet a gravel alley be considered improved? Regarding the multiple surveys you mentioned, I do not believe a surveyor is qualified to determine what constitutes an improved versus unimproved alley. A surveyor’s primary responsibility is to establish property boundaries and accurately describe existing site conditions. As for your example at 8857 Kildare, that case doesn’t apply to our discussion as it is not a public alley, it involves a vacated alley. I visited the site, and it is not an alley but rather a patch of grass maintained by the adjacent homeowner (see attached photo). I also observed an improved alley while driving south on Crawford, just before Dempster, which has a concrete surface and proper drainage (see attached photo). My point is that we cannot rely on how a surveyor labels a surface to determine whether it is improved or unimproved. We need to rely on what the Municipal or Zoning code states. In this case, there appears to be no clear defini+on in any of the Skokie codes specifying whether gravel is considered an improved surface. I believe I have a strong case that a gravel alley is not considered an improved surface, for several basic reasons that most civil engineers and neighboring municipali+es would agree with: 1. It lacks proper drainage, resulting in standing water during storms. 2. It is not a uniform, durable, or a sealed ground covering designed to withstand all weather conditions and traffic. 3. Heavy rainfall and snowmelt can wash away gravel, leading to erosion and uneven ground conditions. The interpreta+ons you referenced in your email below seems to suggest that the defini+on of an “improved alley” is if an alley is drivable, it is considered improved. However, the Zoning code does not make that dis+nc+on. It states that “new curb cuts are prohibited unless the lot does not abut a public improved alley.” The ques+on then is: what is the official interpreta+on of an “improved alley”? Since the Skokie Municipal or Zoning code does not appear to define gravel alleys, I reviewed defini+ons and official documents of what cons+tutes an "unimproved alley" from Skokie and nearby municipali+es. The findings are consistent and support the posi+on that gravel alleys are considered “unimproved" as outlined below: 1. In a Skokie Plan Commission memo (attached) dated 7-17-25, case 2025-06P states that “ a current owner of a parcel that contained an “unimproved alley” at 5500 W. Howard added gravel to the alley without any permit. The Plan Commission stated the owner has 180 days to remove the gravel and "improve” the alley with either asphalt or concrete and proper drainage”. If as you have stated, a gravel alley is considered an "improved alley" why would the Plan Commission ask the owner to “improve” the existing gravel alley by adding asphalt or concrete with proper drainage? In this document you can clearly see that the Skokie Plan Commission does not view gravel alleys as an “improved alley”. If the Plan Commission would have viewed the gravel alley as an “improved alley” they would have let the owner keep the gravel alley and just make him apply for a permit. 1. The City of Chicago Department of Transportation (CDOT), in its (2019) Rules and Regulations for Construction in the Public Way (page 131, attached), explicitly classifies a gravel alley as an unimproved surface. CDOT Construction Standards 2. A 2010 court case in the City of Evanston involved a plaintiff injured in an unimproved alley. The court record (attached, see page 3) notes that the City of Evanston classified a gravel alley as an unimproved alley. Given that the Skokie ordinance does not define what an “improved alley” is, and based on the findings 4 of 7 above, I firmly believe that our property at 6900 Leclaire Ave should be permitted to have a new curb cut on Morse Ave as we do not have access to an “improved alley" as required by Zoning code 118-212(c)(6), which, by all reasonable definitions, would mean an asphalt or concrete surface with proper drainage. I’m asking for you to grant the right to do what we ini+ally discussed in Spring of 2025, to relocate the exis+ng curb cut to Morse Ave. If you disagree, I plan to escalate this further. Our architect’s work remains on hold pending resolu+on to this issue. I look forward to hearing from you. Thank you, Roman Bujdei Owner of 6900 Leclaire Ave Skokie Il 60077 P: 773-447-0808 (cell) From: Brian Augustine <Brian.Augustine@Skokie.Org> Date: Thursday, November 6, 2025 at 11:08 AM To: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com>, Johanna Nyden <Johanna.Nyden@SKOKIE.ORG> Subject: RE: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway Relocation Roman, Good morning. I will give my interpreta+on as the Zoning Official on some of the comments in the emails below. Alley is defined in our Zoning Ordinance as: Alley means any public right-of-way, with a width of not less than 16 feet and not more than 24 feet, which affords a secondary means of vehicular access to abutting properties. A street shall not be considered an alley. The 16-foot wide gravel right-of-way (aka alley) abutting your lot is 100% an alley. It is public right-of-way, between 16 and 24 feet wide affords secondary means of vehicular access to abutting properties. Gravel In regards to gravel being an improved surface or not. In regards to parking on private property, gravel is not an approved surface to park on. So Erik is technically correct regarding gravel parking surfaces on private property. In regards to alleys, I have a different interpretation. Regarding an alley being improved with gravel so vehicles can drive over on it. Gravel alleys have definitely been improved because there have been improvements made to the surface to make this a drivable area. Improvement is defined as: an example or instance of improving or being improved. The gravel has definitely been added and maintained to improve the drivability of the alley. We can all agree that a majority of Skokie’s alleys are gravel. There is maintenance on gravel alleys (adding new gravel, re-grading etc.) similar to maintenance on permeable surface or asphalt alleys. The maintenance is done to help keep the improved area drivable. I have attached a plat of survey from 8857 Kildare. As you will see the surveyor notes Unimproved Alley. Also attached is an aerial photo of 8857 Kildare – showing that area with grass, trees and other natural vegetation. This area clearly has not been improved with any surface (gravel, pavers, asphalt) and is therefore is unimproved. Also attached is a survey of 7742 Mulford St that shows a lot abutting a 16’ Public Alley - Gravel. There are no notes on this survey stating the alley is unimproved, because it has been improved with the gravel surface. A survey from 5139 Morse Ave is also attached, a neighbor down the street from your lot. The survey notes “16-FT Alley” with no notes on this alley being unimproved. This is a also a gravel alley. There are numerous other surveys that I can show that mention a gravel public alley or a public alley with absolutely no indication that the alley is unimproved because of its gravel surface. The alley that abuts 6900 Leclaire Ave is an alley that has been improved with a gravel surface that allows for vehicular travel. Could your gravel alley use some maintenance? It certainly could. Has it been improved with a surface that the Village of Skokie has clearly allowed to be used for in other alleys throughout the Village? It absolutely has been. Take care , <image001.png> Brian J. Augus+ne _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ZONING ADMINISTRATOR/ PERMIT SUPERVISOR community development DEPARTMENT/ building & inspec+on services DIVISION _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5 of 7  5127 Oakton Street Skokie, Illinois 60077 Phone: (847) 933-8408 Office 847-933-8223 www.skokie.org Save +me and apply for your permit online at www.skokiepermits.com From: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com> Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 5:07 PM To: Johanna Nyden <Johanna.Nyden@skokie.org> Cc: Brian Augus+ne <Brian.Augus+ne@skokie.org> Subject: Re: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway Reloca+on Hi Johanna, Thank you for your email. I’d like to clarify a few items based on your response. 1. Tree Removal You mentioned that a tree would need to be removed if we relocate the driveway onto Morse. That would not be necessary, as there is sufficient space to install a driveway between the two existing trees. 2. Relief Based on “Improved Surface” Definition You stated that there are no options for relief. However, I believe the “improved surface” clause provides a valid basis for relief. The ordinance states: “Access to off-street parking can only be from a public alley. Subsequent to October 16, 2023, new curb cuts are prohibited unless the lot does not abut a public improved alley. Relief may only be granted for mixed-use, business, or industrial properties.” The alley behind our property is not an “improved” alley, as it is gravel and grass (see attached photo). In February, I reached out to the Skokie Public Works Department, and Erik Sanchez confirmed that a gravel alley is not considered an improved surface—consistent with other municipalities’ interpretations. Please see the attached email from Erik for reference. 1. Pedestrian Environment and Neighborhood Character You mentioned that adding a driveway would disrupt the pedestrian environment. I respectfully disagree. Nearly all homes (except one) with frontage on Morse between LeClaire and Laramie already have driveways. Denying one in this case would actually be inconsistent with the existing character of the block. 2. Intent of the Ordinance The key question for relief has always been whether a request aligns with the character of the block. Since over 90% of the homes in this area have front yard driveways, it seems consistent with the intent of the code to allow one here as well. Thank you again for your time and consideration. I appreciate your and Brian’s review of this matter and am happy to discuss further. <image003.png> From: Johanna Nyden <Johanna.Nyden@skokie.org> Date: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 at 10:42 AM To: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com> Cc: Brian Augustine <Brian.Augustine@skokie.org> Subject: RE: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway Relocation Hi Roman, Thank you for the follow-up. I wanted to share that I reviewed your submissions for the property with the Village’s Public Works Department and we con+nue to observe that the alley is a usable point of vehicular access and LeClaire is also a street that can con+nue to be the pathway if a garage/driveway is preferred. We understand the traffic is heavier on LeClaire, but there are no op+ons for relief in our code to make these changes. Addi+onally, crea+ng a new curb cut on Morse and disrup+ng the pedestrian environment/public sidewalk further/removing a parkway tree is not a best prac+ce for new development and is in conflict with established planning documents the Village Board has adopted. I do understand the need for a backyard. If you are able to design a new home that u+lizes the exis+ng curb cut or modifies it slightly to shir it south slightly, we could likely work with you on this. This may give you backyard space to the north of a new structure. 6 of 7  Please con+nue to work with Brian Augus+ne on this. He is the Village’s Zoning Official. Johanna From: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com> Sent: Monday, October 20, 2025 4:33 PM To: Johanna Nyden <johanna.nyden@skokie.org> Subject: BUJDEI: 6900 Le Claire Ave Driveway Reloca+on Hi Johanna, hope you are doing well, I just wanted to reach out to you about our driveway relocation, attached you will find a letter of explanation from me and Jaki along with some supporting documentation. We would be open to meeting in person to discuss this further. Roman Bujdei P: 773-447-0808 (cell) AERIAL 1: AERIAL 2: [NOTICE: This message originated from an external source -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open kachments unless you are sure the contet is safe.] [NOTICE: This message originated from an external source -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open akachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] [NOTICE: This message originated from an external source -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open akachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] [NOTICE: This message originated from an external source -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open akachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] [NOTICE: This message originated from an external source -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open akachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] 7 of 7  16' PUBLIC GRAVEL ALLEY 75.30' R-2 ZONING LANDSCAPE LANDSCAPE LANDSCAPE REQUIRED EXISTING/PROPOSED LOT SIZE: 4,800 9,337.2 LOT WIDTH: 40' 75' BUILDING HEIGHT: 30' (PITCHED) 23' (FLAT ROOF) GROUND FLOOR AREA: 650 SF (MIN) 3080 SF REMOVE FRONT YARD: 25' 25' EXISTING SIDE YARD: 7' 7' 24.8' REAR YARD ASPHALT COMBINED SIDE YARD: 20% OF LOT WIDTH = 15.06' 17' APRON CORNER SIDE YARD: 10' 10' REAR YARD: 30' OR 20% (WHICHEVER IS LESS) = 24.8' 40' CONCRETE MAXIMUM LAND COVERAGE 40% OF LOT AREA = 3,734 SF 3,156 SF PATIO BY BUILDINGS FLOOR AREA RATIO 0.6 = 5,602 SF TBD FOR ALL BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES ON A LOT 124.0' 124.0' ACCESSORY STRUCTURES: N/A (ATTACHED GARAGE) MAX HEIGHT: 15' 7' SIDE YARD 10' SIDE YARD REAR YARD COVERAGE: 30% WALK AN ACCESSORY BUILDING OR STRUCTURE IS PROHIBITED IN A REQUIRED FRONT OR SIDE YARD OR WITHIN 60' FROM 2 STORY FRAME A FRONT LOT LINE. RESIDENCE WITH AN ACCESSORY BUILDING OR STRUCTURE IN A REAR YARD SHALL BE AT LEAST 3' FROM A LOT LINE EXCEPT THAT THE SETBACK REQUIRED SHALL BE AT LEAST:(A)THE DISTANCE REQUIRED FOR A SIDE YARD ABUTTING A STREET ON CORNER LOTS.(B)THE DISTANCE REQUIRED FOR A FRONT YARD ON THROUGH LOTS.(C)5' FROM THE LOT LINE BASEMENT ABUTTING THE ALLEY. CONC. IMPERMEABLE SURFACE REQUIREMENTS: REQUIRED PROPOSED REQUIRED FRONT YARD: 55% 725 SF = 38.50% TOTAL LOT AREA: 50% 4,094 SF = 43.84% 2 CAR ATTACHED GARAGE COVERED ENTRANCE 25' FRONT YARD LANDSCAPE CONCRETE WALK ASPHALT DRIVEWAY LANDSCAPE LANDSCAPE 75.30' CONC. WALK NEW CONCRETE APRON SHAPED PLLC DATE: 8.6.2025 SHEET TITLE: ARCHITECT DRAWN BY: A.T. OANA HERGHELEGIU CHECKED BY: O.H. PROPOSED SITE PLAN REVISION DATE: PROPOSED SITE PLAN 6900 LE CLAIRE AVE SCALE: 1/8"=1'-0" SKOKIE, IL 60077 30 N CLARK ST, STE. 3300 CHICAGO, IL 60602 DRAWING NUMBER: T-1 O: 312.373.0453 C 2025 SHAPED PLLC INFO@SHAPED.DESIGN CIVILAND, PLLC Lincolnwood, IL. 847.877.6900 Design Firm 184.008369 info@civilandllc.com www.civilandllc.com Date: November 17, 2025 To: Village of Skokie Zoning Board of Appeals 5127 Oakton Street Skokie, Illinois 60077 Re: Alley Surface Classification at 6900 LeClaire Avenue, Skokie, IL To the Members of the Zoning Board of Appeals: At the request of the property owner, I reviewed the existing conditions of the public alley located along the rear property line of 6900 LeClaire Avenue in Skokie. The purpose of this letter is to provide my professional engineering opinion regarding whether the alley, as present today, would be classified as an improved or unimproved alley under standard civil engineering practice. 1. Background and Basis of Review I have been a licensed Professional Engineer in the State of Illinois since 2004. My practice includes private development, roadway and alley design, pavement re-construction, and municipal infrastructure evaluation. Based on photographs of the alley, site condition descriptions, and typical engineering definitions used by municipalities throughout the region. 2. Existing Conditions The alley surface consists of: • Loose crushed gravel aggregate, CA-7 • No paved surface (asphalt, concrete, or pavers) • No constructed drainage facilities such as inlets, gutters, or cross-slope controls • Evidence of rutting and patch grading • No engineered subbase or pavement structure These characteristics are consistent with a gravel access way rather than a paved alley. 3. Engineering Standards for “Improved” Alleys In civil engineering, an alley is considered improved when it includes: • A durable, engineered pavement surface matrix (asphalt, concrete, or permeable pavers) • A designed structural pavement section with subbase • Grade controls and drainage features intended to manage stormwater • Long-term durability suitable for all-weather vehicular use A gravel surface does not meet these criteria and is generally classified as unimproved or under-improved. 1 CIVILAND, PLLC Lincolnwood, IL. 847.877.6900 Design Firm 184.008369 info@civilandllc.com www.civilandllc.com This is consistent with the usage found in neighboring municipalities, including Chicago and Evanston, which both identify gravel alleys as unimproved in their public works and legal documents. Skokie’s own Plan Commission has also described gravel alleys as unimproved in past cases. 4. Professional Certification Based on the conditions described and standard engineering definitions, it is my professional opinion that: The alley abutting 6900 LeClaire Avenue should be classified as an unimproved alley. The existing gravel surface does not constitute an improved alley under typical acceptable civil engineering criteria. Respectfully submitted, SABIN OLTEANU, PE 062-056303 11/30/2027 Certifier’s Name License Number Exp. PRINCIPAL Title CIVILAND, PLLC Company Name 7017 N TRIPP AVE. Address LINCOLNWOOD IL 60712 City State Zip 11/17/2025 847-877-6900 Signature Date Phone 2  Friday, November 14, 2025 at 22:03:54 Central Standard Time Subject: RE: Question regarding "improved" surfaces Date: Friday, February 7, 2025 at 1:58:40 PM Central Standard Time From: Erik Sanchez To: Roman Bujdei Attachments: image001.png Hi Roman, Gravel is not considered an improved surface. Thank you, ERIK SANCHEZ, P.E. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ TRANSPORTATION ENGINEER PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT/ENGINEERING DIVISION _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5127 Oakton Street Skokie, Illinois 60077 Phone: (847) 933-8286 www.skokie.org From: Roman Bujdei <roman@bldpermits.com> Sent: Friday, February 7, 2025 9:59 AM To: Erik Sanchez <Erik.Sanchez@Skokie.Org> Subject: Quesfon regarding "improved" surfaces Hi Erik, I wanted to ask you a general question. What is Skokie’s definition regarding “improved” surfaces? Would a gravel paved parking space, driveway or alley be considered an “improved” surface? Thanks, Roman [NOTICE: This message originated from an external source -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open ajachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] 1 of 1  Plan Commission Approved Summary Meeting Minutes Date: August 17, 2023 The Chairman called the roll recognizing that there was a quorum present with 2 commissioners absent. Case Description: 2023-20P: Special Use Permit: 5238 Touhy Avenue Bond Touhy LLC, on behalf of Mike Joudeh, requests a special use permit for outdoor dining in a B2 Commercial zoning district, and any other relief discovered during the review of this case. PIN: 10-28-313-036-0000 Discussion and Interested Parties Legal notice was advertised and posted as prescribed by the Zoning Chapter. Personal notice was not provided and therefore, Corporation Counsel determined that notice was not proper and correct. Mr. Mike Joudeh, representing Qahwah House, stated that notice was overlooked and requested a continuance. The chairman offered to have the case put on the agenda for the September 7, 2023 meeting. The Village Manager considers this request as a pilot case for allowing outdoor dining submittals to be processed solely by staff review. The petitioner will be permitted to assemble the outdoor dining area now but were instructed not to install any permanent fixtures prior to the Plan Commission meeting and Village Board’s final disposition. Mr. Joudeh was agreeable to the September 7, 2023 meeting date. A new legal notice will need to be mailed out next week to fulfill notice requirements. Recommendations and Voting No vote was taken. This case was continued to the September 7, 2023 meeting. 613615 - Plan Commission meeting minutes – August 17, 2023 – Case 2023-20P  Plan Commission Approved Summary Meeting Minutes Date: August 17, 2023 The Chairman called the roll recognizing that there was a quorum present with 2 commissioners absent. Case Description: 2023-18P: Zoning Chapter Amendment: Driveways The Village of Skokie requests an amendment to Chapter 118, Zoning – Article XI Off- Street Parking and Loading Facilities, to prohibit new curb cuts and front yard driveways on lots that abut or have access to a public improved alley. Discussion and Interested Parties Legal notice was advertised as prescribed by the Zoning Chapter. Corporation Counsel determined that notice was proper and correct. Staff requested that the report be accepted into the record as written. In addition to the recent sustainability changes made, the Village continually tries to improve the pedestrian quality of Skokie by making a more walkable environment. Along with adding more public sidewalks, the Community Development Department and Engineering Division are proposing to prohibit new driveways on residential streets for lots that abut a public alley. They have summarized their reasoning as: 1) Storm water reduction into the combined sewer system: The more driveways and aprons from streets, the more stormwater will run off into the sewer system instead of parkway & front lawn areas. The less storm water draining to the streets, the less flooded streets and water back-up into basements. 2) Pedestrian friendly environment: The Village has added new public walks where there were none. The intent is to eliminate the need for pedestrians walking in the street. The public walkways provide pedestrians a safer walk without the chance to being struck by a vehicle. Public Works has added 9 full blocks of public walks over the past several years and plans to install 4-6 blocks each year. Also, there is less of a chance of conflict between pedestrians and vehicles if there are less driveways that cross over walkways. 3) Loss of green space in the front yard and parkway: Mature front yard and parkway trees are lost because of new front yard driveways. It takes years for a newly planted tree to acquire the leaf area of a mature tree. In addition, there is a loss of oxygen which captures CO2. When new aprons are installed, the parkway turns into less green space. 4) Loss of on-street parking spaces; New front yard driveways and curb cuts are for the convenience of the property owner but result in the loss of 2 on-street parking spaces. On residential blocks with smaller lot widths, there is less street parking for guests. If a property does not abut an alley, a driveway accessible from the street will still be permitted. 613546 - Plan Commission meeting minutes – August 17, 2023 – Case 2023-18P Some commissioners commented that some alleys are in better condition than others. Some alleys have protruding vegetation that make it difficult to pass through. There are unimproved gravel alleys that are in bad condition and full of ruts. Public Works needs to improve alleys to minimum standards before the ordinance is written. Staff suggested that residents must communicate the condition of their alleys to Public Works. Another commissioner mentioned that in the winter, alleys are not always plowed as quickly as streets and it could be difficult to get out. He also noted that if a car is stuck in the alley then there is no way out for others. Another commissioner inquired how this change will affect teardowns with existing driveways. Staff stated that the driveway can stay but cannot be expanded. Another commissioner noted that curb cuts and front driveways take away on-street parking spaces but also frees up on-street parking spaces as well. Staff noted that people use their garage for storage and park on the driveway apron and often times vehicles overhang onto the sidewalk. Also, after a snowstorm when plows clear the street, some snow ends up back onto driveway aprons which is then pushed out into the right- of-way. A commissioner wanted to amend the proposed language to reflect that this change is only for a new curb cut or driveway at properties that are served by an alley. Recommendations and Voting A motion was made to approve the request, as amended to clarify proposed language, to prohibit new curb cuts and front yard driveways on lots that abut or have access to a public improved alley. It was decided to add the word “New” to Article XI., Section 118- 212(c)(6.)Location. Motion: J. Burman Second: S. Berman Absent: P. Ousley R. Mathee Ayes: 7 Nays: 0 613546 - Plan Commission meeting minutes – August 17, 2023 – Case 2023-18P  Plan Commission Approved Summary Meeting Minutes Date: August 17, 2023 The Chairman called the roll recognizing that there was a quorum present with 2 commissioners absent. Case Description: 2023-19P: Zoning Chapter Amendment: Drive Through Provisions The Village of Skokie requests an amendment to Chapter 118 of the Skokie Village Code to modify provisions for drive-through facilities. Discussion and Interested Parties Legal notice was advertised as prescribed by the Zoning Chapter. Corporation Counsel determined that notice was proper and correct. Staff requested that the report be accepted into the record as written. This is a follow-up from the April 20, 2023 Plan Commission meeting where staff refined recommendations for drive- through policy considerations. Drive-throughs discourage walking, public transit, and visits to neighboring businesses. They lead to accidents involving pedestrians and cyclists and other vehicles. There are several non- code proposals that are being implemented and intended to reduce some of the negative impacts of drive-through facilities. 1) require an operation plan that reduces the queuing line 2) prohibit deliveries during peak hours 3) require mobile ordering as part of the business plan 4) require restaurants to offer composting and recycling as part of the waste management In addition, there are several code changes to be made to support sustainability and manage the effects of drive-throughs. 1) adopt a specific definition for drive-through facilities 2) require drive-throughs to be screened from a street and place them behind buildings 3) remove food-related drive-throughs as an allowed use from the mixed-use districts (NX, TX, and CX) 4) reduce the parking requirement from 1 space for each 100 sf to 1 space for each 150 sf 5) no mature, healthy trees to be removed to accommodate drive-throughs and for every 100 trips generated, a new tree or fee-in-lieu shall be paid to the Village to offset drive-through emissions. The chairman mentioned the Chipotle Restaurant on Dempster which took over a drive-through restaurant and created a new model for the drive-through component. They require mobile ordering ahead using the drive-through lane solely for pick-up. A commissioner suggested refining the location language by removing “behind buildings” and inserting “shall be screened with vegetation wherever possible”. 613586 - Plan Commission meeting minutes – August 17, 2023 – Case 2023-19P Another commissioner noted that the new Dunkin Donuts on Dempster & Lockwood has cars moving across the front of the building. Staff acknowledged this fact and stated that there is a stricter review process in place which requires plans to better fit subject sites. The Dunkin Donuts was retrofitted into the bank site using the existing drive-through. A commissioner offered that the majority of Skokie residents are not educated enough on composting and the onus is on the restaurant owner to provide receptacles for dining and kitchen waste. Another commissioner added that a restaurant owner has no control on how his patrons dispose of garbage. Staff interjected that on the west coast, in Seattle, restaurants are required to compost and in Los Angeles, residents are required to do so. The commissioners agreed that Skokie isn’t there yet and mandatory composting is not an amendment in the Village Code. Recommendations and Voting A motion was made to approve the request as presented for an amendment to Chapter 118 of the Skokie Village Code to modify provisions for drive-through facilities. Motion: S. Berman Second: V. Gupta Absent: P. Ousley R. Mathee Ayes: 7 Nays: 0 613586 - Plan Commission meeting minutes – August 17, 2023 – Case 2023-19P ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS TUNNELING - By Code, tunneling is defined as placing “a shaft, cable, pipe, main, conduit, wire or other transmitting or conducting device underneath the surface of any public way in the city by driving the same through the earth underneath the surface of any such public way, or by boring or tunneling under any such public way.” Tunneling is advancing an opening, regardless of size, below the ground surface without using conventional cut and cover construction methods. Tunneling methods may include but are not limited to hard rock TBM, soft ground TBM, slurry TBM, microtunneling, drill and blast, shield excavation, roadheader excavation, sequential excavation methods, NATM, horizontal directional drilling, directional drilling, directional boring, tunnel boring machine advancement, jack and bore, direct pipe methods and trenchless technology. UNIMPROVED - Any-portion of the Public way which has not been paved in accordance with City standards and specifications, including but not limited to gravel roadway, W.P.A. streets, and asphalt or gravel sidewalks, driveways and alleys. UTILITY - Shall mean any corporation, City, or other governmental subdivision, partnership, organization, or any individual or persons who owns or operates lines, facilities, and systems for producing, transmitting, or distributing communications, power, electricity, telecommunication, light, heat, gas, oil, crude products, steam, water, sewer and other similar commodities, including all Telecommunications Providers and providers of cable television. The term "Utility" includes, but is not limited to the current members of CDOT OUC set forth in Appendix G to these Regulations. For the purposes of this manual, a Utility shall also mean any person or entity engaged by, or on behalf of, a Utility to perform street opening work. VIADUCT/BRIDGE - Any load-carrying structure, including supports erected over an obstruction (such as waterways, railroads, or other roadway), having a passageway for carrying vehicular and/or pedestrian traffic. ELIZABETH GUTSTEIN Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF EVANSTON, a municipal corporation Defendant-Appellant. Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division. (Mar 12, 2010) DOCKET NO. No. 1-08-3607 JUDGES JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court: JUDGMENT JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff Elizabeth Gutstein filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County against the municipal defendant, the City of Evanston (City), alleging that she fell and suffered injuries to her elbow resulting from the municipality's negligent maintenance of an unimproved alley in back of plaintiff's home. A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $201,829.00, less a 50% deduction for contributory negligence, and the trial court entered judgment on that verdict. The City appeals the trial court's denial of its timely filed posttrial motion. On appeal, the City argues that (1) plaintiff was not an intended user of the alley and thus the City is entitled to a judgment n.o.v. , (2) the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that plaintiff was an intended user as a matter of law, and (3) the City was entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to § 2-201 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). BACKGROUND On July 10, 2004, plaintiff pulled a weed from the backyard garden of her home in Evanston and decided to dispose of the unwanted plant in the yard waste disposal bin provided for her use by the City. Two unimproved alleys abut plaintiff's property. One alley runs north-south along the eastern edge of plaintiff's property and the other runs east- west along the southern edge of the property. Plaintiff's yard waste bin, along with disposal containers for recycling and trash, sit outside plaintiff's property along the east-west alley (alley). A gated fence encircles plaintiff's backyard, so plaintiff proceeded down a path through her backyard to the gate to enter the alley. When she reached the gate, plaintiff testified that she scanned the area to make sure there were no depressions or other impediments in the alley. Prior to stepping out into the alley, plaintiff heard an ice cream truck driving along the alley and turned to locate the vehicle. She then stepped out into the alley and tripped in a "softball-sized" depression in the unimproved alley, causing her to fall and suffer injuries to her elbow. Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 1 of 16 Plaintiff's partner, Patricia Butkus, testified at trial that she had been complaining to the City about the condition of the east- west alley for years. Ms. Butkus testified that she telephoned the City on numerous occasions and left voice-mail messages with the public works department. In March 2004, Ms. Butkus exchanged e- mail correspondence with City Alderman Elizabeth Tisdahl, in which she complained that commercial traffic was damaging the alley and creating a dangerous condition in the vicinity of the gate to Ms. Butkus's and plaintiff's property. Ms. Butkus testified that Alderman Tisdahl visited the alley shortly thereafter and agreed that the area around the gate was in poor condition. Alderman Tisdahl assured Ms. Butkus that she would place the plaintiff's residence on the City's priority list for alley repairs and instructed Ms. Butkus to telephone the City to follow-up and confirm that this was done. A locally popular hot dog stand, Mustard's Last Stand, is located south of the east- west alley and commercial vehicles travel along the alley to make deliveries there. The property east of Mustard's is the location of Northwestern University's football stadium. The alley abutting plaintiff's property is what the City calls an "unimproved alley," meaning that it is unpaved. There was some dispute at trial as to what material constituted the surface of the alley at the time of plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff argued that the alley surface consisted of limestone gravel while the City maintained that the alley had been resurfaced with asphalt chips. Both parties agree that the ravages of winter cause significant damage to the surface of an unimproved alley. In order to address this problem, the City had instituted a program of annually regrading its unimproved alleys. Glen Crabtree, a public works supervisor for the City testified for the plaintiff as an adverse witness pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1102 (West 2008). Mr. Crabtree's duties included the care and maintenance of the city's alleys, streets, and sidewalks. As a supervisor, Mr. Crabtree reported to the superintendent of streets and sanitation, who reported to the director of public works, who in turn reported to the city manager. The city manager was responsible for determining the budget for public works, including the care and maintenance of the City's unimproved alleys. However, the city manager's determination still had to be approved by the city council. When asked about the governmental structure of the City, Mr. Crabtree stated that the City has a home rule form of government, in which the mayor and aldermen make the policy determinations. The various city departments, including the public works department, then implement and carry out those policies. According to Mr. Crabtree, the City did not maintain its unimproved alleys for pedestrian traffic; it maintained the alleys only for vehicular traffic. Mr. Crabtree testified that as soon as weather permitted in the spring, he would re-fit the City's snow removal equipment for grading and work with labor crews to regrade the City's unimproved alleys. He testified that it was his practice to make sure that the alley adjacent plaintiff's property was regraded each year prior to the City's Fourth of July parade because of increased pedestrian traffic in the area for the festivities. However, Mr. Crabtree also testified that he did not keep records demonstrating the progress of the annual regrading program, nor did he have any Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 2 of 16 independent recollection that the alley had been regraded prior to July 10, 2004. When a city resident calls to complain about the condition of an unimproved alley, Mr. Crabtree testified that he would typically go out to the site of the complaint within 48 hours of receiving the call. After examining the site, he would determine whether or not the area needed repair and, if it did, would place the location on his list of pending specific repairs. Only after the city- wide regrading program was complete would Mr. Crabtree perform specific repairs requested by residents. Mr. Crabtree testified that he did not have any record or independent recollection of Ms. Butkus's telephone calls and voice- mail messages complaining about the condition of the alley. Plaintiff and Ms. Butkus placed their garbage containers in the alley, as opposed to someplace on their property, because the containers had always been in the alley and that was where the neighbors placed their garbage containers. In addition, Ms. Butkus testified, "that's where the city trucks pick it up." Mr. Crabtree confirmed that the City would not pick up refuse, yard waste, or recycling from private property. Pursuant to City ordinance, residents must place their garbage containers on the curb or alley line for pick- up. If a resident's property abuts an alley, then the resident must place his or her garbage containers in the alley. Only if a resident's property does not abut an alley may the resident place garbage containers on the street curb. The City's web page describing garbage pick-up policies states: "Garbage must be placed on the curb or alley line by 7 a.m.; it will not be collected from private property." (Emphasis in the original.) At trial, the City attempted to argue that plaintiff did not have to keep her garbage containers in the alley, that she instead could have placed the containers on a concrete pad next to her garage. However, in order to do that plaintiff would have had to pick up the large containers and place them over a fence. That would have been virtually impossible. When plaintiff and Ms. Butkus purchased the property in 2000, they performed several improvements on the property, including constructing a new 2-car garage, erecting a fence around the backyard, pouring a concrete pad outside the fence next to the garage, and installing a walk-way from the kitchen door to the fence gate to the alley. The City argued that had plaintiff placed her garbage containers on the concrete pad, she could have walked through her backyard, into the garage, and out a garage door to the concrete pad; thus avoiding the alley altogether. Plaintiff testified in response that it was far more convenient for her to take a direct route down her backyard path to the gate and out into the alley where the garbage containers were located, and that if she walked through her garage she still would have had to walk in the alley. After plaintiff rested her case, the City filed a motion for directed verdict arguing that (1) plaintiff was not an intended user of the alley and therefore the City did not owe her a duty of ordinary care pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/3-102 (West 2008), (2) the City had no notice of the alleged pot hole or depression in the alley, and (3) the City was immune from liability pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). The trial court denied the City's motion on all three issues. Speaking specifically to the first issue raised by defendant, the trial court Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 3 of 16 stated: "I think the plaintiff is an intended user." Plaintiff filed a motion for directed verdict after the City rested its case, arguing that (1) plaintiff was an intended user of the alley, (2) the City had notice of the condition of the alley prior to plaintiff's injury, and (3) the City failed to prove discretionary immunity pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). When the trial court objected to the form of plaintiff's motion, instructing that a directed verdict is different from deciding an issue as a matter of law, plaintiff amended her motion for directed verdict to cover only the notice issue, and moved to strike the City's affirmative defenses that plaintiff was not an intended user and that the City had discretionary immunity. The trial court struck the City's discretionary immunity defense because it found the City's alley maintenance program ministerial. However, at that time the trial court reserved the issue of whether plaintiff was an intended user of the alley for the jury to decide, and denied plaintiff's motion for directed verdict. Later, when discussing the language to be used in the jury instructions, plaintiff's counsel argued that the jury should not decide the issue of whether plaintiff was an intended user of the alley. Plaintiff's counsel argued that the issue of intent was a component of the question whether the City owed plaintiff a duty of care, which was a matter of law and not a question of fact for the jury. The trial court agreed. COURT: We are not going to have a determination by the jury whether this is intended, an intended user. I have determined that as a matter of law. DEFENSE COUNSEL: So as a matter of law she is an intended user despite Crabtree saying we don't maintain this for pedestrians? COURT: We already ruled on that, yeah. As noted, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $201, 879.00, which it reduced by 50% for plaintiff's contributory negligence. The jury also answered two special interrogatories, which found that the City did have notice of the condition of the alley prior to plaintiff's injury. The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict in the amount of $100,939.50. The City then filed a posttrial motion requesting that the trial court grant the City either a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. The trial court denied the City's motion. ANALYSIS The City raises three challenges to the trial court's denial of its request for posttrial relief. First, the City argues that the plaintiff was not an intended user of the municipal alley pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2008) and that, therefore, the City is entitled to a judgment n.o.v. Second, the City argues that even if the trial court did not err in failing to grant the City a judgment n.o.v. , the trial court abused its discretion in determining as a matter of law that plaintiff was an intended user of the alley. Finally, the City argues that the trial court improperly denied the City's motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 4 of 16 City had discretionary immunity pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). All of the City's arguments involve questions of law, which we review de novo. Kouzoukas v. Ret. Bd. of the Policeman's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446, 463 (2009); Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay, 232 Ill. 2d 446, 451 (2009). 1. Was plaintiff an intended user of the alley? The City first argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant a judgment n.o.v. in its favor because plaintiff was not an intended user of the alley. A judgment n.o.v. should only be granted where all of the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non- moving party, so overwhelmingly favors the moving party that no contrary verdict could ever stand based on that evidence. Pedrick v. Peoria Eastern Railroad Company, 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967). We cannot "usurp the function of the jury and substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and determined from the evidence which did not greatly preponderate either way." Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 452-53 (1992). "The court has no right to enter a judgment n.o.v. if there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, demonstrating a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome." Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 454. In order to maintain a cause of action for negligence, plaintiff must establish that the City owed a duty of ordinary care, breached that duty, and an injury was proximately caused by that breach. Curatola v. Village of Niles , 154, Ill. 2d 201, 207 (1993). Whether the City owed plaintiff a duty of care is a question of law for the court to decide. Vaughn v. City of W. Frankfort, 166 Ill. 2d 155, 158 (1995); Marshall v. City of Centralia, 143, Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1991). The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) limits the common law duties of municipalities. Marshall, 143 I11. 2d at 5; Curatola, 154 Ill. 2d at 208. Section 3-102(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part: "[A] local public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom the entity intended and permitted to use the property in a manner in which and at such times as it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used ***." 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2008). Thus, according to the statute, a municipality owes a duty of ordinary care only to those who are both intended and permitted users of municipal property. 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2008). Because "the Act `is in derogation of the common law,'" we must construe it strictly against the municipal defendant. Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d at 158, quoting Curatola, 154 Ill. 2d at 208. "[A]n intended user of property is, by definition, also a permitted user; a permitted user of property, however, is not necessarily an intended user." Boub v. Township of Wayne, 183 Ill. 2d 520, 525 (1998). "[T]he duty of a municipality depends on whether the use of the property was a permitted and intended use. *** Whether a particular use of property was permitted and intended is determined by looking to the nature of the property itself." Vaughn, 161 Ill. 2d at 162-63. Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 5 of 16 "Intent must be inferred from the circumstances." Sisk v. Williamson County, 167 Ill. 2d 343, 351 (1995). Both parties agree that plaintiff was a permitted user of the ally; the only issue for us to decide is whether plaintiff was also an intended user. Generally, "an alley is a roadway designed for vehicular traffic, and the duty imposed on a municipality under section 3-102(a) is the same as that imposed for a street," Khalil v. City of Chicago, 283 Ill. App. 3d 161, 164-65 (1996), and municipalities do not owe a duty of ordinary care to pedestrians walking in the street, Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d at 161 . However, Illinois courts have recognized narrow exceptions to this rule. One exception is where a municipality has designated areas for street parking. In those cases, pedestrians are intended and permitted users of the roadway for the narrow purpose of entering and exiting the parked vehicle. Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d at 351; Torres v. City of Chicago, 218 Ill. App. 3d 89, 94 (1991) (finding plaintiff an intended user of the roadway when he stepped back from the trunk of a legally parked vehicle: "use of the parking space logically entails pedestrian use of the adjacent areas in order to enter and exit the parked vehicle and such use of the street is therefore also intended and permitted and reasonably foreseeable"); DiDomenico v. Village of Romeoville, 171 Ill. App. 3d 293, 295-96 (1988) (finding plaintiff an intended user of the roadway when he stepped off the sidewalk in order to access the trunk of his legally parked vehicle: "It defies common sense to conclude that such local entities did not contemplate and intend that the operator of the vehicle along with passengers would use the street area around the parked vehicle for ingress and egress to and from their vehicle."). This narrow exception extends only to those pedestrians who must necessarily walk in the roadway in order to access a legally parked vehicle; an unnecessary use of the roadway where a legal alternative exists, such as a crosswalk, in order to access a vehicle does not qualify for this exception. Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d at 351-52 (finding that plaintiff was not an intended user of a country roadway with no marked parking spaces, walkways, or crosswalks); Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge, 148 Ill. 2d 417, 426 (1992) (finding that plaintiff who crossed a six- lane country highway outside of a crosswalk in order to reach his parked car was not an intended user of the roadway). Thus, Illinois courts have established that something more than mere necessity is required in order for a pedestrian to be an intended user in a roadway; there must be some affirmative physical manifestation of the municipality's intent that a pedestrian use the roadway. Boub, 183 Ill. 2d at 528 (finding that a lack of special pavement markings or other signs indicating that bicycles were intended users of a bridge precluded a finding that plaintiff was an intended user of the bridge); Torres, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 94 (finding that where a municipality permits parallel parking on a roadway, it intends that drivers of the vehicle will use the roadway in order to enter and exit the vehicle). Where there are no affirmative physical manifestations of a municipality's intent, necessity cannot apply the duty of ordinary care for a sidewalk to a roadway. Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d at 352 . In Sisk , the plaintiff's motor vehicle struck a concrete bridge crossing a creek and when plaintiff exited his auto to investigate the extent of the damage, he fell off the roadway and into the creek. 167 Ill. 2d at 346. On appeal, the court held that the municipal defendant had no duty to maintain county roads for pedestrian traffic without some affirmative physical Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 6 of 16 manifestation of intent. Sisk, 167 I11. 2d at 352. As our supreme court explained, "In contrast, there are no such manifestations to indicate that Williamson County intended pedestrians to walk on its country roads, much less the specific road and bridges complained of by plaintiff in the case at bar. As the appellate court noted, there are no walkways or crosswalks on rural country roads such as the county-line road in this case. Further, many county roads are gravel roads and often have no shoulder. We believe that the inference to be drawn from these facts, if any, is that municipalities do not intend that pedestrians walk on rural country roads. Although it may be necessary at times for pedestrians to walk on country roads, such use is not a manifestation of the local municipality's intent that pedestrians walk on its country roads or an undertaking by the municipality to make country roads free from defects that might injure pedestrians." Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d at 351-52. In the case at bar, we do not have physical manifestations of the City's intent but the City has established a policy requiring its residents to place their trash, recycling, and yard waste containers in the alley, which is municipal property. The policy expressly states that the City will not pick up the refuse from private property; residents must use the City property. We have previously held that a person who violates a municipal ordinance referring to a piece of municipal property cannot be an intended user of that property. Montano v. City of Chicago, 308 Ill. App. 3d 618, 624 (1999) (a delivery person who violated a city ordinance when stopping his delivery truck in an alley could not be an intended user of the alley). We have considered the issue of whether pedestrians can be intended users of municipal alleys in three previous cases and in each case, the determination was fact- specific. In Khalil, the plaintiff was walking down the middle of an alley in order to get from a parking lot to a restaurant when he tripped in a hole and fell. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 162. In essence, the plaintiff was using the alley as a sidewalk and there were no affirmative physical manifestations that the defendant municipality intended for pedestrians to walk down the middle of the alley. Khalil, 283 Ill App. 3d at 164. Accordingly, we found that plaintiff was not an intended user of the alley and thus the municipality had no duty to maintain the alley in a condition suitable for pedestrians. Khalil, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 164. In Kavales v. City of Berwyn, the plaintiff's decedent was walking along a sidewalk and entered an alley where the alley intersected a sidewalk. 305 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539 (1999). When she entered the alley, the plaintiff's decedent was still within the lines of the sidewalk on either side of the alley. Kavales, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 539. She stepped into a "depressed, uneven, and cracked" portion of the alley and fell. Kavales, 305 Ill App. 3d at 539. We determined that, even though plaintiff' decedent was technically in an alley when she fell, the location was in effect a "`sidewalk area.'" Kavales, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 544 . Accordingly, we found that plaintiff's decedent was an intended user of the alley where it intersected the sidewalk, because the sidewalk was used for pedestrian traffic. Kavales, Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 7 of 16 305 Ill. App. 3d at 544. The facts of Thomas v. Town of Cicero ( 307 Ill. App. 3d 840 (1999)) most closely approximate those of the instant case. In Thomas , the plaintiff walked through her backyard and out into the alley in order to dispose of a bag of trash in her garbage can, which was located in the alley. 307 Ill. App. 3d at 841. After she threw away her trash, the plaintiff continued down the alley in order to visit a neighbor. Thomas 307 Ill. App. 3d at 841. After she had progressed several feet down the alley from her garbage can, plaintiff tripped and fell on a crack in the alley. Thomas 307 Ill. App. 3d at 188. In Thomas, the defendant municipality admitted that its alleys were "`easements for people to get [to] their garages, utilities, electric, cable, [and] garbage.'" 307 Ill. App. 3d at 842. Justice Warren Wolfson, writing for this court, found that the defendant municipality had created a "safe harbor" in which the plaintiff was an intended user of the alley so long as she walked along the path to her garbage can, which is the second narrow exception found by Illinois courts. Thomas, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 845 . However, once the plaintiff departed from that "safe harbor" and proceeded down the alley to visit her neighbor, she could no longer be an intended user of the alley, merely a permitted one. Thomas, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 845 . Because plaintiff "had thrown away her garbage and had stepped away from the protection of her easement when she tripped and fell," we found that she was not an intended user of the alley. Thomas, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 845. Justice Wolfson's safe harbor analysis should apply in the instant case. See Thomas, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 845. When the City enacted its ordinance directing plaintiff to place her yard waste, trash, and recycling containers in the alley, it created a safe harbor in which plaintiff could walk along the alley in order to reach the containers. The ordinance provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "(A) Residences With Access To An Alley: All residences which abut upon an alley shall designate a collection site at the edge of the property directly adjacent to such alley. Where practicable, the site shall not be fenced or otherwise closed off in such a manner as to impede efficient collection. Any gates leading to the collection site from the alley shall be unlocked. The collection site may be on the alley itself, provided that containers shall not interfere with the free movement of vehicles in the alley. (B) Residences Without Alley Access: 1. Occupants of residences whose property does not abut an alley shall locate garbage containers along the curb immediately adjacent to the property.***" Evanston City Code § 8-5-11 (2004). Plaintiff complied with the City's ordinance and garbage pick-up policy when she placed her waste containers in the alley and thus should fall within a safe harbor, where pedestrians are intended users of the alley when they walk in the alley only to access their waste containers. Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 8 of 16 The City argues that it was unnecessary for plaintiff to enter the alley in order to dispose of her yard waste, and thus plaintiff was not an intended user of the alley because she could have kept her waste containers on the concrete pad next to her garage. We are not persuaded by this argument. First, the concrete pad is part of plaintiff's private property. The City's waste pick- up policy clearly states that the City will not pick up waste from private property. Therefore, the City's suggestion is not a viable option, as it violates the written policy. Second, even if plaintiff was able to access her waste containers from the concrete pad, the City's argument is analogous to saying that the driver of a legally parked vehicle should climb over the gear shift and exit the vehicle from the passenger side door in order to avoid walking in the roadway. We have previously found that where a municipality manifests an intent that people park their vehicles on the street, the municipality also intends that the occupants of those vehicles walk in the roadway for the purpose of accessing the parked autos. See, e.g., Torres, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 94. That same analysis should apply here as well. In the instant case, the City, by passing an ordinance that residents must place their waste containers in the alley, manifested an intent that plaintiff place her waste containers in the alley. The logical inference is that the city also intended that plaintiff be able to access her waste containers and that means walking in the alley in order reach them. Finally, The City's argument would have us penalize plaintiff for improving her property. The City's argument implies that if plaintiff had not installed the concrete pad, then she would have been an intended user of the alley when she walked in the alley in order to access her waste containers. Plaintiff installed the concrete pad after purchasing the property in 2000. The previous owners had kept their waste containers in the alley and had no alternative location, such as a concrete pad, in which to place them so as to avoid walking in the alley in order to throw away their garbage. As our supreme court has made clear, we must look to the nature of the municipal property to determine the municipality's intent. Vaughn , 161 Ill. 2d at 162-63. Therefore we cannot look to improvements or changes made to private property abutting the City's property to determine the City's intent with respect to its own property. But, the City argues, once plaintiff installed the concrete pad, the City no longer intended for plaintiff to walk in the alley. A municipality's intent cannot change because of an independent act of a third party without some affirmative manifestation of that changed intent on the part of the municipality. Boub, 183 Ill. 2d at 528. The City also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding whether plaintiff was an intended user of the alley as a matter of law, rather than allowing the jury to decide the issue. We do not find this argument persuasive. "The `intended and permitted' determination informs the duty issue, and the duty issue is a question of law." Thomas, 307 Ill App. 3d at 845, citing Khalil , 283 Ill App. 3d at 162-63. The trial court acted well within its discretion when it determined that plaintiff was an intended user of the alley as a matter of law. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff was an intended user of the alley and the City owed her a duty of care pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/3-102 (West 2008). Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 9 of 16 2. Did the City have discretionary immunity? The City also argues that it was immune from liability pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). Governmental entities bear the burden of properly raising and proving that they are immune under the Act in order to bar plaintiffs' recovery. Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 207 Ill. 2d 359, 370 (2003). The Act grants immunity to municipal defendants engaged in certain discretionary acts. 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). Section 2-201 provides as follows: "Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused." 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). Section 2-209 allows municipalities to shelter under the immunity granted to public employees covered by section 2-201. 745 ILCS 10/2-209 ("A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable."). Our supreme court has held that the Act sets up, in essence, a two-part test to determine which employees may be granted discretionary immunity under section 2-201. An employee may qualify for discretionary immunity "if he holds either a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving the exercise of discretion." Harineck v. 161N. Clark Street Ltd. P'ship, 181 111. 2d 335, 341 (1998). However, an employee who satisfies the first prong of the test must also have engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the plaintiff's injury resulted. Harineck , 181 Ill. 2d at 341. Whether the act or omission in question is discretionary or ministerial must be determined on a case- by- case basis. Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474; Anderson v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1113 (2000). Therefore, we must determine, first, whether Crabtree was in a position involving the determination of policy or an exercise of discretion and, second, whether he both determined policy and exercised discretion when maintaining the alley. See Harineck, 181 Ill. 2d at 341. Policy determinations, as used in section 2-201, involve "`those decisions which require the municipality to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.'" Harineck, 181 Ill. 2d at 342, quoting West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992). "Discretionary acts are those which are unique to a particular public office, while ministerial acts are those which a person performs on a given state of facts in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, and without reference to the official's discretion as to the propriety of the act." Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 446, 474 (1995). "`A municipal corporation acts judicially or exercises discretion when it selects and adopts a plan in the making of public improvements, but as soon as it begins to carry out that plan it acts ministerially and is bound to see that the work is done in a reasonably safe manner.'" Greene v. City of Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 10 of 16 Chicago, 73 Ill. 2d 100, 108 (1978), quoting Johnston v. City of E. Moline, 405 Ill.460, 466 (1950). Our supreme court further explored the contours of discretionary versus ministerial acts in In re Chicago Flood Litigation: "Official action is judicial where it is the result of judgment or discretion. Official duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task, and when the law which imposes it, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion of its performance with such certainty, that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. [Citation.] A [municipal] corporation acts judicially, or exercises discretion, when it selects and adopts a plan in the making of public improvements, such as constructing sewers or drains; but as soon as it begins to carry out the plan, it acts ministerially, and is bound to see that the work is done in a reasonably safe and skillful manner.'" 176 Ill. 2d 179, 194 (1997), quoting City of Chicago v. Seben , 165 Ill. 371, 377-78 (1897). Two lines of cases have emerged as Illinois courts have considered the issue of what constitutes "determining policy" and "exercising discretion" for the purposes of applying discretionary immunity. 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). The first line of cases follows the reasoning of Greene and maintains that when a municipal employee is deciding whether and how to implement a program of maintenance and improvements, that employee is "determining policy" and "exercising discretion" as required by section 2-201. 73 Ill. 2d at 108; see, e.g., Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 194; and Hanley v. City of Chicago, 343 Ill. App. 3d 49, 57 (2003). But once the employee is carrying out that maintenance or improvement program, the employee's actions are ministerial and do not give rise to discretionary immunity. Greene, 73 Ill. 2d at 108; see, e.g., Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474-75; and Anderson, 317 Ill. App. 3d. at 1117. The second line of cases seems to find that any act that would result in liability for a municipality is "determining policy" and "exercising discretion." Courson v. Danville Sch. Dist. No. 118 , 333, Ill. App. 3d 86, 9 1 (2002) (finding that a shop teacher's decision to remove the safety shield from a saw involved a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion); Wrobel v. City of Chicago, 318 Ill. App. 3d 390, 395 (2000) (finding that laborers' decisions concerning how to fill pot holes involved a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion); Johnson v. Decatur Park Dist., 301 Ill. App. 3d 798, 809 (1998) (finding that a tumbling coach's decisions not to ensure adequate placement of safety mats and not to warn of the dangers inherent in using a mini trampoline involved determinations of policy and exercises of discretion). Our supreme court has offered some guidance on determining what sorts of positions involve "determining policy" and "exercising discretion." 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). Most recent cases granting discretionary immunity involve decisions that took place at the executive or policy-making level. Arteman v. Clinton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 487 (2002) (school district decided not to provide roller blading safety equipment for a high school physical education class), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 244 Ill. 2d 213 (2007); Harineck, 181 Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 11 of 16 Ill. 2d at 342 (fire marshal planned and executed a fire drill in a downtown high- rise); Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 195 (City of Chicago retained discretion to change location of bridge pilings). In Harineck, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered injuries resulting from the fire marshal's negligent conduct during the course of a fire drill. 181 Ill. 2d at 338. During the fire drill, the marshal directed an entire floor of people, including the plaintiff, to stand in the vicinity of a heavy, windowless door in a crowded elevator area, where more people were placed than the area could hold. Harineck, 181 Ill. 2d at 338. When the door was suddenly pushed opened, it struck and injured the plaintiff's head causing serious injury. Harineck, 181 Ill. 2d at 338. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the fire marshal was entitled to discretionary immunity under section 2-201 of the Act. Harineck, 181 Ill. 2d at 343. The court reasoned that the fire marshal was in a position involving the determination of policy because he "bears sole and final responsibility for planning and executing fire drills in buildings throughout Chicago" and that he both determined policy and exercised discretion in the course of the fire drill at issue in the complaint. Harineck, 181 Ill. 2d at 343. Justice Garman proposed the following framework for explaining the court's reasoning in Harineck: "First, we should ask: Where does the official whose action is challenged stand in the relevant hierarchy of decisionmakers? Did he bear the sole and final responsibility for the decision in question, or was his decision to act as he did subject to review and approval by others? The higher the official stood in the relevant chain of command, the more likely it is that he acted with discretion for the purposes of section 2-201." Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 392 (2003) (Garman, J., dissenting). In our analysis, we must determine whether or not Mr. Crabtree was "serving in a position involving the determination of policy and/ or the exercise of discretion," as required for discretionary immunity under section 2-201. 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). Mr. Crabtree never testified that he made determinations of policy. Instead, he testified that such determinations came from the mayor and aldermen of the City. Crabtree merely checked out residents' complaints about the condition of specific alleys and, from those complaints, made a list of locations which needed repairs. There is no evidence in the record of this case that his list was used as the basis of repairs that were made, and other people in the city also provided lists for repair. In fact, Crabtree testified that he had no record or independent recollection of that alley during the spring of 2004. Since the City had established a program of annually regrading all its unimproved alleys, carrying out this regrading program appears to be "absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task." Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 174. In addition, our supreme court has made clear that while the decision of whether to implement a program of repairs is both a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion, carrying out that program is a ministerial act. Greene, 73 Ill. 2d at 108; see, e.g., Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474-75; and Anderson, 317 Ill. App. 3d. at 1117. Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 12 of 16 The instant case fits squarely within this general rule and we see nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Crabtree's actions or lack of actions in maintaining the alley is the sort of conduct that would be immune from liability under the Act. Defendant points to Wrobel v. City of Chicago in support of the proposition that laborers who fix potholes hold positions requiring both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion and thus are eligible for discretionary immunity under 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). 318 Ill. App. 3d 390, 395 (2000). In Wrobel, the plaintiff's alleged that they suffered injuries resulting from the defendant municipality's negligent repair of a pothole. 318 Ill. App. 3d at 391 . The record in Wrobel disclosed how the work was done. We affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the defendant was entitled to discretionary immunity under 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008), explaining: "These workers are directed by [their foreman] to remove `as much' loose asphalt and existing moisture in a pothole `as possible' before applying the cold mixture. While they are obligated to undertake such measure pursuant to the express directive of their foreman, the workers enjoy discretion in determining how much asphalt and moisture should be actually extracted and whether that amount is indeed adequate to ensure a durable patch. The decisions of the workers in this regard can also fairly be characterized as policy determinations. When confronted with a particular stretch of roadway, the workers must necessarily be concerned with the efficiency in which they prepare any potholes for repair. Specifically, the workers must allocate their time and resources among the various potholes that will be repaired, and they must ensure that not too much time is dedicated to pothole preparation. The more time and resources the workers devote to preparing potholes for a patch, the less time and resources they have available to repair the other potholes existing throughout their daily grid. For the same reasons discussed above, the extent of the workers' removal efforts represent both a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion. The degree to which a pothole should be prepared, and specifically how much loose asphalt and moisture will be removed, is a matter of a worker's personal judgment, and encompassed within that judgment are the policy considerations of time and resource allocation during a given workday." Wrobel, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 395. In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record to show that any work was done in the alley, certainly not how it was done. Every case must be decided on the evidence and facts of that case. The burden was on the city to prove how and why they are entitled to immunity and they have failed to sustain that burden. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 370. We distinguish Wrobel on its facts. In Wrobel the question of the defendant's negligence focused on the minutiae of how municipal workers repaired a particular pothole, because Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 13 of 16 there was no dispute that the municipal defendant had patched the pot hole just days before the plaintiffs' injury. 318 Ill. App. 3d at 395. This inquiry examined such factors as how much water a worker removed from a pothole before patching it and what sort of material was used to form the patch. Wrobel, 318 Ill App. 3d at 395. In the case at bar, the City had established a program to annually regrade its unimproved alleys. Glen Crabtree, a public works supervisor for the City, testified that he usually regraded the alley in question prior to the Fourth of July. However, Mr. Crabtree testified that he had no record that he had regraded the alley prior to July 10, 2004, and that he had no independent recollection that he had done so, or what had been done. Thus the question for the jury was not whether the City properly prepared the depression that tripped plaintiff, or whether the City utilized the proper materials. The question was far more simple: was the alley repaired and was it repaired adequately? When the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, two reasonable inferences can be drawn: either the City did not regrade the alley prior to July 10, 2004, or, even if the City did regrade the alley during that Spring, the regrading was negligently carried out. The City presented no facts at trial to suggest that the regrading process in the instant case involved the sort of complex, location- specific determinations that were in question in Wrobel. In the case at bar, Crabtree testified that the city made annual repairs, but there is no evidence of what they did. Our supreme court has made clear that whether a municipality engages in a program of public improvement is a discretionary matter but the manner in which the municipality implements the program is not. Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474-75 ("We are also mindful of the long-standing common law principle that, although a governmental agency has discretion in determining whether to perform a public work or make an improvement, once the decision to perform the work is made, it must be done with reasonable care and in a nonnegligent manner."), see also Baran v. City of Chicago Heights, 43 Ill. 2d 177, 180-81 (1969) ("In holding a city responsible for injuries thus caused the court is not reviewing the city's discretion in selecting a plan. It is not controlling or passing upon the city's estimate of public needs. Nor is it deciding what the `best' kind of improvement may be. It is simply saying that when a city creates a hazardous condition and someone is injured as a consequence it must respond in damages, just as others are required to do."). This indicates that discretionary immunity should not extend to a municipality's actions when carrying out a program of maintenance and repair such as the one in the case at bar. In addition, twenty days before the opinion in Wrobel was published, we explicitly stated that we would not grant discretionary immunity to every act performed by a public employee. We cautioned against an overly expansive reading of section 2-201, explaining: "Every failure to maintain property could be described as an exercise of discretion under municipal defendants' expansive approach to governmental immunity. The legislature could not have intended such a result; otherwise, it would not have codified the common law duty to maintain property under section 3-102 of the Act. The Act must be strictly construed against the public entity involved." Anderson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1117, quoting Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 278 (1991). Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 14 of 16 Notwithstanding the findings in Wrobel, we will continue to construe section 2-201 strictly against municipal defendants. The City argues that Mr. Crabtree exercises discretion in determining which alleys to regrade, when, and with what materials. While this may be true, Mr. Crabtree was not the final arbiter of whether plaintiff's alley would be regraded or otherwise repaired in the spring of 2004. Ms. Butkus testified that she had complained about the condition of the alley via telephone and e-mail to Alderman Tisdahl. Alderman Tisdahl had come to inspect the condition of the alley near plaintiff's fence gate and agreed that the condition was poor and in need of repair. Alderman Tisdahl then assured Ms. Butkus that she would put the alley on the City's priority list for spot repairs. Thus, Alderman Tisdahl, not Mr. Crabtree, exercised discretion in determining that plaintiff's alley should be repaired. Once Alderman Tisdahl made the decision that plaintiff's alley needed repair, Mr. Crabtree no longer had discretion to determine whether the alley needed attention. His role became purely ministerial: carrying out the maintenance requested by the Alderman. Again, the City points to Wrobel , and argues that Mr. Crabtree exercised discretion in determining how to fill the depressions in the alley by plaintiff's fence gate. If the City had presented evidence at trial that Mr. Crabtree had in fact repaired the depressions by regrading the alley then we would be presented with the question of whether Mr. Crabtree exercised discretion in choosing which materials to use in the regrading. However, no such evidence was presented at trial. Instead we only have Mr. Crabtree's assertion that he attempts to regrade this particular alley in time for the Fourth of July parade each year and so he must have regraded the alley by that time in 2004. This is not an issue of whether Mr. Crabtree used the correct materials in regrading the alley, but rather whether he regraded the alley at all. There was no evidence presented at trial that he did. Once Alderman Tisdahl put plaintiff's alley on the priority list for repairs, Mr. Crabtree no longer had discretion to decide whether or not to allocate City resources for the repair of plaintiff's alley. That decision had been taken out of his hands. All that was left for Mr. Crabtree was to carry out the requested maintenance, an act that we have previously found to be ministerial. The City argued at oral argument that the trial court prevented it from presenting a complete discretionary immunity defense pursuant to section 2-201. 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). However, the record does not support that assertion. Plaintiff called Mr. Crabtree as an adverse witness pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1102 (West 2008). While Mr. Crabtree was on the stand, the City cross examined him in great detail about his duties as a public works supervisor and his role in the City's alley maintenance program. After plaintiff rested her case, the City moved for a directed verdict because, among other arguments, it claimed that it had discretionary immunity pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). The trial court denied that motion. Then the City recalled Mr. Crabtree as a witness in its case in cheif and questioned him further about his role in the public works department. After the City rested its case, plaintiff filed a motion for directed verdict claiming that the City had failed to sufficiently prove discretionary immunity. The trial Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 15 of 16 court determined, after hearing all of the evidence presented to the jury, that the City had failed to establish that it qualified for discretionary immunity under the Act. 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). The City was given the opportunity to present its case; the trial court did not bar the City from arguing discretionary immunity until after the City had presented all of its evidence on the issue. The City has the burden of proving that it qualifies for discretionary immunity and the City failed to meet that burden. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 370. Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctly barred the City from presenting a discretionary immunity defense pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Affirmed. J. GORDON and McBRTIDE, JJ., concur. Printed by licensee : roman bjdei Page 16 of 16 STAFF REPORT 2023-18P: Zoning Chapter Amendment Community Development Department Council Chambers, 7:30 PM, August 3, 2023 To: Paul Luke, Chairman, Skokie Plan Commission From: Brian J. Augustine, Zoning Administrator and Permit Manager Case: 2023-18P: Zoning Chapter Amendment Driveways General Information Petitioner Village of Skokie Purpose The Village of Skokie is requesting an amendment to Chapter 118, Zoning Article XI Off Street Parking and Loading Facilities, to prohibit new curb cuts and front yard driveways on lots that abut or have access to a public improved alley. STAFF ANALYSIS In addition to recent sustainably initiatives, staff has also been reviewing pedestrian friendly policies. The Community Development Department, along with other Village Departments, have always strived to make Skokie a more pedestrian friendly place. Creating a more walkable environment by adding public walks has been a more recent initiative by the Village. Along with the adding of public walks where feasible, staff is striving to make as many walks in town as pedestrian friendly as possibly. In order to achieve further sustainability and a more pedestrian friendly Village, the Community Development Department, with support from the Engineering Division, is proposing to prohibit driveways from a street on a lot that abuts a public alley. The following are the four main reasons staff is proposing this ordinance change: 1. Storm water reduction into the combined sewer system. The Engineering Division is always looking for ways to reduce the amount of storm water draining into the sewer system. The more driveways and aprons from streets that are in the Village, the more stormwater that will run off into the sewer system. Per the Engineering Division, during a 1-inch per hour rainfall event, a driveway and apron of 300 square feet will discharge about 162 gallons of stormwater into the sewer. This of course assumes it is a steady rainfall event. Smaller driveways will produce less than that and larger driveways will produce more. It is possible some of the stormwater may reach a grassy parkway or front lawn area, but if pitched properly, a majority of that stormwater will run to the street. 612995 – Staff Report for 2023-18P – Zoning Chapter Amendment – Driveways 1 of 7 If we can lessen the number of new driveways coming from a street, we can reduce the amount of water draining to the streets in the future. The less stormwater draining to the street means less flooded streets and less water backing up into a basement. 2. Pedestrian friendly environment. Skokie has sought out ways to create a more pedestrian friendly environment throughout the Village. In 2012, Skokie implemented a permit fee that goes towards installing new public walks where there are none. Over the past several years Skokie has added over 9 full blocks of new public walks. In the future the goal is to add about 4-6 blocks per year. The addition of public walks on one or both sides of a street is intended to help remove pedestrians from walking in a street. There is greater chance of being struck by a vehicle if you are walking in a street than if you are on public walkway. There is also a greater chance of being struck by a vehicle if there are driveways that cross walkways. The less vehicle – pedestrian intersecting points, the better. Prohibiting driveways from the street on lots that abut an alley, will help create a more pedestrian friendly environment. The more walkable and pedestrian friendly an area is the greater likelihood a family will go out for a walk together, a person will go for a jog, or children will play together in front yards. 3. Loss of green space and front yard/parkway trees. Staff estimates more than 10 mature front yard or parkway trees have been lost over the past several years because of new front yard driveways. Even though a permit is required to remove a tree and permit fees are set aside to plant new trees, it takes years for a newly planted tree to come close to the leaf area that the mature tree provided. Larger trees usually have more leaf area which in turn produces more oxygen and captures CO2. A larger leaf area means a greater shade area, a greater shade area leads to lower temperatures and a reduction in the heat island effect. The loss of green parkway space was partly discussed in point 1 with the increase in stormwater flow into the street. When new aprons get installed in the parkway this turns into less green space, which leads to less permeable and plantable areas. 4. Loss of on-street parking spaces. Another negative side effect of allowing new curb cuts and driveways is the loss of on-street parking spaces. The convenience the driveway provides to one property owner, results in the loss of one or in most cases two on-street parking spaces. On blocks that have more homes (smaller lot widths) this leads to more guests fighting for less street parking. In some cases, visitors can park on their friend’s driveway, but they may not always fit on the driveway. On properties that do not abut a public alley, a driveway accessible from the street will be still be permitted. The ordinance will always allow a property owner to provide for on-site parking. 612995 – Staff Report for 2023-18P – Zoning Chapter Amendment – Driveways 2 of 7 Staff feels the elimination of driveways from a street, when feasible, will ultimately lead to less stormwater runoff into the street, a more pedestrian friendly and green environment, less trees being removed, and more on-street parking spaces being maintained. Staff has included some examples of similar policies. Also included are photographs showing vehicles blocking public walks, numerous curb cuts on a street that abuts a public alley and a block with zero curb cuts, numerous parkway trees and a copious amount of green space. STAFF RECOMMENDATION Staff recommends that the following sections of Chapter 118 Zoning of the Skokie Village Code be amended, with text to be added highlighted and text to be removed highlighted and stricken through in the attached draft ordinance. ARTICLE XI. OFF-STREET PARKING AND LOCATING FACILITIES Sec. 118-212. - Motor vehicle parking facility design standards. (c) Access driveways to off-street parking and loading spaces. (1) Width of driveways (measured at the street right-of-way line abutting the lot) shall be as follows: a. Residences without shared driveways: Not less than 9 feet wide and not more than 22 feet wide. b. Nonresidence uses and all residences with shared driveways: 1.Not less than 14 feet wide for a one-way driveway; 2.Not less than 20 feet wide for a two-way driveway when less than 20 parking spaces are being served; 3. Not less than 24 feet wide for a two-way driveway when 20 or more parking spaces or 2 or more loading spaces are being served; and 4.Not more than 35 feet wide. (2) The radius connecting the street pavement edge and driveway edges shall conform with the Standards for Parking Lots and Driveways as established by the Engineering Division. (3) The acute angle formed at the intersection of a driveway and street pavement edges shall be not less than 60 degrees. (4) The spacing between separate driveway entrances on a lot (measured at the street right-of-way line abutting the lot) shall be as follows: a. On arterials: Not less than 30 feet. b. On streets not classified as arterials: Not less than 16 feet. (5) On corner lots, the spacing between the driveway entrance and the right-of-way line of the adjacent intersecting street shall be as follows: a. To intersecting arterials: Not less than 15 feet. 612995 – Staff Report for 2023-18P – Zoning Chapter Amendment – Driveways 3 of 7  b. To an intersecting street not classified as an arterial: Not less than 8 feet. (6) Location. Access to off-street parking can only be from a public alley. Curb cuts are prohibited unless the lot does not abut a public improved alley. Relief may only be granted for mixed-use, business or industrial properties. ATTACHMENTS 1. Santa Monica, CA Parking Design and Development Standards 9.28.120 2. Photographs taken in Skokie on July 27, 2023 3. Washington D.C. Residential Driveway and Curb cut application 612995 – Staff Report for 2023-18P – Zoning Chapter Amendment – Driveways 4 of 7 Santa Monica, California 9.28.120 Parking Design and Development Standards All off-street parking and loading areas except those used exclusively for stacked or valet parking, shall be designed and developed consistent with the following standards. A. The design, location or position of any parking layout, entry, driveway, approach or accessway from any street or alley shall be approved by the Director. B. Parking Access. 1. Driveways. Driveways must lead to parking spaces that comply with the design standards in this Section and all other applicable standards. a. Single-Unit Residential and Ocean Parking Single-Unit Residential Districts. Subject to Section 9.28.120(B)(3), no more than one driveway to a public street is allowed on a parcel with less than 100 linear feet of street frontage, and no more than 2 driveways to a public street are allowed on a parcel with 100 linear feet or greater of street frontage. b. All Other Districts. Subject to subsection (B)(3), the number of driveways shall not be more than necessary to allow access in and out of a parcel and/or building. 2. Combined Entrances. Combining entrances for off-street parking with those for off-street loading is permitted. 3. Alley Access. Access to parking areas shall be from alleys. Curb cuts are prohibited except where a project site meets at least one of the following criteria: a. The site has no adjacent side or rear alley having a minimum right-of-way of 15 feet. Corner parcels with no adjacent side or rear alley must take access from the side street. b. The average slope of a multi-unit residential parcel is at least 5 percent. c. The Director determines that a curb cut is appropriate due to traffic, circulation, or safety concerns. d. Commercial properties may have nonresidential parking access from side streets. 612995 – Staff Report for 2023-18P – Zoning Chapter Amendment – Driveways 5 of 7 PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN ON JULY 27, 2023 All photographs taken are of streets that abut alleys. 1. 7800 Block of Kenton – Truck making a delivery and partially blocking a public walk. 2. 8400 Block of Drake – Van parked and partially blocking a public walk. 612995 – Staff Report for 2023-18P – Zoning Chapter Amendment – Driveways 6 of 7 3. 8100 Block of Tripp Ave. - There are fourteen homes on the east side of the 8100 block of Tripp and all the homes have attached garages with driveways to the street. 4. 7900 Kilbourn Ave – There are ten homes on the west side of the block and no driveways to the street. 612995 – Staff Report for 2023-18P – Zoning Chapter Amendment – Driveways 7 of 7 Brian Augustine From: Russ Rietveld Sent: Friday, January 2, 2026 9:53 AM To: Brian Augustine Subject: Improved vs unimproved Good morning, There are platted ‘alleys’ in Skokie where an alley has not been constructed, but the ‘alley’ has not yet been vacated. An example of this is platted public right of way, for a potential alley, between 5128 and 5120 Suffield Court. As you can see, the public ROW exists, but an alley was never constructed. In addition, there is no direct vehicular access. This is an unimproved alley. 1 2 The Village maintains four types of improved alleys. If there is continuous concrete, permeable pavers, asphalt or gravel, the alley is improved. The Village and adjacent property owners can utilize and traverse these public rights of way. Thanks, RUSS RIETVELD, PE _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING PUBLIC WORKS _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5127 Oakton Street Skokie, Illinois 60077 Phone: (847) 933-8231 www.skokie.org 3 Brian Augustine From: Michael Lochner Sent: Friday, December 26, 2025 1:07 PM To: Brian Augustine Subject: Gravel alleys From: Michael Lochner Sent: Friday, December 26, 2025 11:23 AM To: Brian Augustine <Brian.Augustine@skokie.org> Subject: RE: Gravel alleys - ZBA interpretation case Brian, I believe this is an improved alley do to the following work that is completed annually. We graded this alley on June 27,2025. When we grade the alley we scarify the center of the alley with our road grader, then make two cleaning passes that takes all the debris out of the alley with a 11 or 12 foot blade, and load that into a dump truck, then we put one dump truck load of new stone in the alley and level it out with usually two more passes with the grader. Alley trimming: Every winter we clear the alley from encroaching plants and trees so cars and trucks can make it through without been hit with branches. We will be starting alley trimming any day now and that alley will be graded in the spring or early summer. Let me know if you need anything else. Thanks, Mike MIKE LOCHNER _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ SUPERVISOR PUBLIC WORKS/STREETS AND ALLEYS _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 9050 Gross Point Rd. Skokie, Illinois 60077 (847) 933-8427 www.Skokie.org 1